Hybrid Market Design Considering Heterogeneous System Operator Preferences

The increasing number of distributed players on power grids is likely to lead to the emergence of energy communities, exchanging electricity within and between themselves, but also with the main market, resulting in what is called heterogeneous markets. In this context, the system operator has to handle the potential network congestion resulting from the power flows set up by these heterogeneous markets. By sending signals to distributed flexibilities, a feasible economic optimum is bound to be reached but would systematically target the most flexible agents. These are likely to be the least wealthy communities, and so such a management, although efficient, could be perceived as unfair. Our aim is not to discuss the definition of fairness to be adopted, but to propose a leverage to the system operator to resolve congestion according to a criterion other than the economic optimum. This contribution proposes to introduce heterogeneous preferences, enabling the system operator to apply its chosen definition of fairness. In a case study, the system operator is able to shift the efforts repartition between communities to manage congestion, thus guaranteeing all communities fair access to the network.